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a b s t r a c t 
A popular distinction in the human and animal learning literature is between deliberate (or willed) and 
habitual (or automatic) modes of control. Extensive evidence indicates that, after suﬃcient learning, living 
organisms develop behavioural habits that permit them saving computational resources. Furthermore, hu- 
mans and other animals are able to transfer control from deliberate to habitual modes (and vice versa), 
trading off eﬃciently ﬂexibility and parsimony – an ability that is currently unparalleled by artiﬁcial 
control systems. Here, we discuss a computational implementation of habit formation, and the transfer 
of control from deliberate to habitual modes (and vice versa) within Active Inference: a computational 
framework that merges aspects of cybernetic theory and of Bayesian inference. To model habit formation, 
we endow an Active Inference agent with a mechanism to “cache” (or memorize) policy probabilities from 
previous trials, and reuse them to skip – in part or in full – the inferential steps of deliberative process- 
ing. We exploit the fact that the relative quality of policies, conditioned upon hidden states, is constant 
over trials; provided that contingencies and prior preferences do not change. This means the only quan- 
tity that can change policy selection is the prior distribution over the initial state – where this prior 
is based upon the posterior beliefs from previous trials. Thus, an agent that caches the quality (or the 
probability) of policies can safely reuse cached values to save on cognitive and computational resources –
unless contingencies change. Our simulations illustrate the computational beneﬁts, but also the limits, of 
three caching schemes under Active Inference. They suggest that key aspects of habitual behaviour – such 
as perseveration – can be explained in terms of caching policy probabilities. Furthermore, they suggest 
that there may be many kinds (or stages) of habitual behaviour, each associated with a different caching 
scheme; for example, caching associated or not associated with contextual estimation. These schemes are 
more or less impervious to contextual and contingency changes. 
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 


























Imagine a tourist visiting a new city for the ﬁrst time, having
o choose which bus or metro to take to reach the city centre.
his choice problem requires planning and the careful consider-
tion of alternative routes, with their respective costs and bene-
ts. However, in successive visits to the same city, the tourist can
kip these complicated evaluations and reuse good solutions – un-
ess (for example) a metro station has been closed in the mean-
ime, making some replanning necessary. This simple example
llustrates the fact that humans and other animals can ﬂexibly in-
est more or less resources (e.g., attention resources) into cognitive∗ Corresponding author. 
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puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 asks, depending on task demands and uncertainty. A traditional
istinction in human psychology and the animal learning literature
s between deliberative (goal-directed) and habitual (automatic or
outine) systems: deliberative, goal-directed decisions consider the
urrent situation and use prediction to foresee the consequences
f potential plans, while habits reﬂect information slowly accu-
ulated over time; e.g., information about past rewards collected
hile executing a given action. In general, deliberative process-
ng is considered more cognitively demanding but also more ﬂexi-
le than habits [3,14,47] . This distinction has received considerable
mpirical support but its computational principles and neuronal
ases are still debated [15] . A particularly challenging question is
he way an adaptive agent should balance declarative and habitual
trategies and under which conditions it should allocate or transfer
ontrol between them. The ability to transfer control from (ﬂexi-
le but demanding) deliberative strategies to (cheaper but inﬂex-
ble) habitual strategies, and vice versa, is considered a hallmarkunder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
 mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
2 D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 

























































































































e  of adaptive behaviour and cognitive control, which permits one to
combine adaptivity and parsimony; but its mechanisms are incom-
pletely known. 
1.1. Background and open questions 
In this article, we ask how control should be transferred from
deliberative to habitual control strategies, and vice versa, from the
perspective of a normative – Active Inference – agent model [24] . 
The transfer of control from deliberative to habitual strategies
(after a number of trials that is plausibly suﬃcient to reduce envi-
ronmental uncertainty and behavioural variability) is called habiti-
sation — and has been studied widely in the animal and hu-
man learning literature. While developing habits is generally useful
to alleviate cognitive and behavioural demands, it can also have
drawbacks. When an animal performs a behavioural (e.g., lever
pressing) task for which it is rewarded (e.g., with a food) for a long
period, and operates in conditions of low environmental volatility,
it can develop habits that become inﬂexible. In other words, eﬃ-
cient habits preclude a context sensitivity that is necessary when
environmental contingencies change. Behavioural inﬂexibility is as-
sessed using a number of procedures, such as by testing the ani-
mal’s sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation (e.g., the food delivered
by lever pressing is deprived of value because the animal is se-
lectively satiated with the same food [3,4,9,31,32] ). If the animal
perseverates (e.g., continues pressing the lever) after the reinforcer
devaluation, it is considered to be under habitual control and re-
ﬂecting the loss of the ability to switch back to a more ﬂexible,
context-sensitive, deliberative (or goal-directed) form of control. 
However, inﬂexible perseveration is a rather extreme situation
that is usually associated with overtraining (or lesions [4,31] ):
in most real-time situations, a person whose actions are con-
trolled automatically is still able to re-engage deliberative process-
ing when necessary, and especially when automatic control fails
[47] . For example, a person who is learning to drive initially de-
votes her full attention to the driving task; but she can successively
automatise most actions (and perform other tasks while driving).
Crucially, if something goes wrong with the habitual policy (e.g.,
pressing the brake pedal produces a loud noise), the driver can
re-engage her deliberative system and redeploy her attention to
the task. This example suggests that in some cases, it is possible
to transfer control from deliberative to habitual systems (and rou-
tinise behaviour), without losing the ability to transfer control back
from habitual to deliberative systems – perhaps with the aid of an
additional (supervisory) system that monitors the success of au-
tomatic strategies and/or contextual changes [47] . In sum, as the
above discussion prompts a set of questions about what habits are
and how they are formed in the ﬁrst place; whether there are dif-
ferent (more or less severe) forms of habitization [3,47] ; and under
which conditions habit formation implies behavioral inﬂexibility. 
A widespread assumption in the literature is that deliberative
and habitual strategies of choice may correspond to two different
control schemes that operate in parallel and continuously compete
for being selected [10] . These two control schemes would corre-
spond to model-based and model-free controllers of reinforcement
learning, respectively. These two controllers differ in that the for-
mer entails a form of prospective evaluation of future rewards,
whereas the latter uses cached action values; but importantly, they
are learned in parallel. However, an emerging alternative is that
deliberative strategies are acquired ﬁrst and scaffold the acquisi-
tion of habitual strategies. For example, habitual strategies may de-
rive from a “compression” or “caching” of deliberative strategies
(e.g., by chunking action sequences) that entail a more parsimo-
nious use of cognitive resources while preserving accuracy – at
least when the agent has no residual uncertainty about the envi-
ronment [11,12,23,49,60,61] . As we discuss below, the idea of aug-Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 enting a deliberative architecture with the ability to cache poli-
ies constitutes a promising approach to understand habit forma-
ion and their deployment under adequate contextual conditions. 
.2. Habit formation and transfer of control in Active Inference 
In this article, we address the above questions from the per-
pective of an artiﬁcial (Active Inference) agent that deploys adap-
ive control in simulated foraging scenarios [26,53] . The active in-
erence agent is quintessentially deliberative; but here we explore
ow it can be endowed with the abilities to acquire habits and
o transfer control from (more demanding) deliberative planning
trategies to (less demanding) habitual routines by caching poli-
ies, when the situation permits; for example, when the choice
ontext is stable. On this perspective, when the current choice sit-
ation induces no residual uncertainty or risk, an agent can select
 behavioural policy act based on a learned (cached) score, rather
han engage in a full deliberative (policy evaluation and selection)
rocess. The underlying idea is that, if contingencies do not change,
olicy scores are stable and caching them might be more eﬃcient
han re-calculating them again. 
Our simulations offer a novel perspective on the relationship
etween deliberation and habits, by suggesting that habitual poli-
ies can form and be selected by caching deliberative policies – and
hat this saves resources (e.g., computational time). The transfer of
ontrol from deliberative to habitual control is based on a simple
threshold-based) evaluation of habitual policy accuracy under the
urrent context, whereas the opposite transfer from habitual to de-
iberative control depends on a mechanism that estimates contex-
ual changes. In other words, an agent that is under the control of
 habitual policy can transfer control to deliberative processes as
ong as it can recognize that the context has changed; conversely,
ailing to notice contextual changes leads to the well-known per-
everation effects of habits and overtraining. 
. Active Inference 
We develop our argument within Active Inference: a framework
hat combines cybernetic ideas on the centrality of control and
rror-correction processes [1,67,83] with an inferential (Bayesian)
cheme [27,60,73] . This section shortly summarizes the key aspects
f Active Inference that are essential to understand the simulations
eported in this article; a more detailed, formal introduction is pro-
ided in Appendix A . 
Active Inference is a corollary of the free energy principle that
asts decision-making and behaviour as a minimisation of varia-
ional free energy (or equivalently, a maximisation of model ev-
dence or marginal likelihood). This means that perception and
ction (or policy) selection are treated as inference problems
2,5,16,25,42,46,55,58,70,76,77,81] . Action selection implies evaluat-
ng the quality of a policy (or action sequence) π for each possi-
le state an agent could be in – which corresponds to calculating
he (negative) expected free energy of π , or G π . Importantly, poli-
ies are evaluated in relation to both their pragmatic or economic
alue (e.g., how well they achieve goals) and their epistemic value
e.g., how well they reduce uncertainty). To understand how prag-
atic value is calculated, it is important to note that active infer-
nce absorbs goals into expected free energy in the form of prior
eliefs about outcomes (that can be produced by acting). One can
hen formulate optimal behaviour as minimising surprise in rela-
ion to these prior beliefs. Furthermore, as minimizing expected
urprise corresponds to minimising entropy, any policy that min-
mises expected free energy is, effectively, resolving uncertainty.
he imperative of resolving epistemic uncertainty is thus part and
arcel of free energy minimisation and it dissolves the exploration-
xploitation dilemma; typically causing agents to forage for infor- mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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dation until they are suﬃciently conﬁdent to pursue their goals or
rior preferences [26] . 
Active Inference is thus a quintessentially model-based scheme,
hich selects actions based on the prospective evaluation of the
ragmatic and epistemic values of candidate policies. This future-
riented (or planned) behavior rests on the notion of the expected
ree energy attained following competing policies. More speciﬁ-
ally, when an agent is in a particular (hidden) state, it can evalu-
te the quality of its policies in terms of the free energy attained
nder each policy: 
 π = 
T ∑ 
τ= t 
G(π, τ ) , 
here 
(π, τ ) = −H[ P (o (τ ) | s (τ ))] · ˆ s(τ ) π −
(
ln ˆ  o(τ ) π − ln P (o (τ ) ) 
)
· ˆ o(τ ) π (1) 
ere, H denotes entropy, and P ( o ( τ ) | s ( τ ) ) is the likelihood of the
enerative model, P ( o ( τ ) ) represents prior beliefs about future out-
omes o ( τ ) according the generative model and ˆ s(τ ) π and ˆ o
(τ ) 
π are
he expected states and outcomes under each policy at time τ , re-
pectively. Heuristically, the ﬁrst term represents the expected res-
lution (an expected value, mathematically) of uncertainty or am-
iguity about outcomes, given hidden states, under the predictive
osteriors over those states Q ( s ( τ ) | π ), while the second term ex-
resses the divergence between the predictive posteriors and pri-
rs over outcomes Q ( o ( τ ) | π ) and P ( o ( τ ) ) (a derivation of Eq. (1) can
e found in [26] ). Intuitively, this scores the difference between
redicted and preferred outcomes in the future, under the policy
n question. This term is formally identical to the objective func-
ion of KL (Kullback-Leibler) control [36] and corresponds to ex-
ected risk in economics [85] . A softmax function of expected free
nergy under each policy G π provides posterior beliefs about the
est policy, from which the subsequent action is sampled. 
The quality of policies (i.e., expected free energy) can be de-
omposed in several ways: in the absence of any ambiguity about
he outcomes in any particular state, the expected free energy cor-
esponds to the KL divergence between the predicted and pre-
erred states. Preferred states are speciﬁed in terms of prior pref-
rences. This means that Active Inference corresponds to risk
ensitive control [33] when there is no ambiguity about out-
omes (when there is ambiguity, the expected free energy also
ncludes an additional epistemic component, please see [26,53] ).
his scheme has been used to model waiting games [28,29] the
rn task and evidence accumulation [19] , trust games from be-
avioural economics [45] , addictive behaviour [72] , two-step maze
asks [26,53] and engineering benchmarks such as the mountainig. 1. The double T-maze scenario used in our simulations. The agent always starts from 
epending on the current context (A-D). 
Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 ar problem [22] . It has also been used in the setting of computa-
ional fMRI [71] . 
In this article, we introduce a fundamental simpliﬁcation of this
ctive Inference scheme, by showing how the evaluation of policies
and subsequent selection – can be ﬁnessed through caching . The
ationale of this idea is that, if the contingencies mediating state
ransitions – and prior preferences – of an agent do not change,
he quality of a policy from any given state will not change from
rial to trial. This means the only things that change are the beliefs
bout the initial and subsequent hidden states the agent ﬁnds itself
n. Thus, it is not necessary to re-compute the expected free energy
 π of policies on subsequent trials, because the only thing that
hanges are beliefs or expectations about hidden states. The latter
an be accumulated from trial to trial so that the agent becomes
ore conﬁdent about the state it starts from. 
Below we introduce three novel computational schemes that
se caching within Active Inference and compare them during a
imulated foraging task (the pseudocode of the three schemes is
eported in Appendix B ). Our simulations will show that (1) cached
olicy probabilities can be used to skip some or all the computa-
ions that underwrite Active Inference, thus entailing a more ef-
cient mode of control (in terms of, for example, computational
ime); (2) these approximations are only valid in some circum-
tances, while in other cases they fail – producing characteristically
nﬂexible behaviour and the perseverative effects of habits. 
. A simulated foraging task 
We illustrate how the caching mechanisms work by focusing on
 simulated foraging task: a double T-maze with 10 locations. In
his set-up, an agent (an artiﬁcial rat) starts from the initial loca-
ion (location 1), and has to reach one of four reward locations (5,
, 8, 10), see Fig. 1 . At every trial, only one of the four reward loca-
ions is actually baited with a reward. The actual reward location
epends on the current choice context, which can be conceptual-
zed as reward contingency: context is A if the reward location is 5,
s B if the reward location is 7; is C if the reward location is 8; and
s D if the reward location is 10. The context is initially unknown
o the agent – but since the agent is tested in the double T-maze
or a number of successive trials (here, 40) it has the opportunity
o learn which context it is in. Learning occurs because when the
gent reaches (or not) a reward at the end of trial, it can (proba-
ilistically) update its estimate of the current context (e.g., getting
 reward in location 5 increases the belief to be in context A. Fur-
hermore, the agent can transfer its context estimation to the next
rial (i.e., it has prior knowledge that context is stable across trials
ith probability 99%) and thus, even if reward delivery is stochas-the start location (location 1) and can collect rewards (only) at states 5, 7, 8 or 9 
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Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of the full active inference procedure. This procedure 
comprises: (A) state estimation after the agent has collected an outcome in its cur- 
rent state (grey denotes high probability), (B) planning 1-step forward; (C) policy 
evaluation, n -steps forward, until the end of the policy; (D) policy / action selec- 
tion; and (E) action. All these steps are repeated, until the end of the trial (in our 
simulations, 4 times, as the trial entails making 4 successive choices). Grey scale 
denotes probability distributions. Note that for simplicity, the generative model il- 
lustrated in this ﬁgure comprises 10 states (10 locations × 1 context), not 40 states 


















































































i  tic (here, reward are delivered in the “correct” location 95% of the
times), it has the opportunity to accumulate information about its
context across trials – or even infer the context has changed. 
3.1. A schematic illustration of Active Inference 
The simulated foraging task can be solved using the delibera-
tive scheme of active inference, which uses a generative model to
calculate the expected free energy G π of (i.e., the path integral of
the free energy expected under — see Appendix A.1 for a detailed
description) the allowable policies, and then selects the next action
using a (precision-weighted) softmax function of G π . A schematic
illustration of the active inference procedure is sketched in Fig. 2
and a pseudocode is shown in Appendix B . 
First, in stage A ( Fig. 2 A), the agent estimates its current state
using its current observations and prior beliefs (not shown); the
grey color of S3 denotes a high probability of being in that loca-
tion. Second, in stage B ( Fig. 2 B), the agent does a one-step “for-
ward planning” to predict the possible future locations (S2 and S4;
light grey denotes a smaller probability compared to S3). Third, in
stage C ( Fig. 2 C), the agent evaluates the quality of all its policies,
i.e., their expected free energy ( G π , see Eq. (1) ), by considering the
integral of the free energy along the states that compose the path
deﬁned by the policy. Note that if the agent’s generative (action-Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 tate) model is deterministic, as in this simulation, the path will
omprise just a sequence of states. However, the model can be
tochastic and thus each policy would entail a probability distri-
ution of future states, as shown in Fig. 2 – and it is this distribu-
ion that will be evaluated. Fourth, in stage D ( Fig. 2 D), the agent
ransforms the list of G π values of the policies into a probabil-
ty distribution (using a precision-weighted softmax function) and
hen it samples an action from it. This means that it uses the ex-
ected free energy or G π values of the different policies as (prior)
robabilities for action selection. Finally, in stage E ( Fig. 2 E), the
gent executes the action to induce a state transition in the “real
orld”. After this transition, the agent samples a new observation
nd starts again from stage A, and so on, until it reaches a termi-
ation (absorbing) state at the end of the maze. 
As shown in previous simulations [26,53] the Active Inference
cheme leads to optimal (free-energy minimizing) behaviour: as
he agent accumulates information across trials about its current
ontext, it selects the reward location more frequently. However,
his scheme is computationally costly and it requires engaging the
ull generative model for planning and policy evaluation that each
rial. Our experiments below show that – in some circumstances
one can eschew parts of the deliberative processing by caching
he probability distribution of the “values” of policies (i.e., their ex-
ected free energy G π ), calculated during previous trials. In other
ords, there are cases in which using cached policy probabilities
s more cost-effective that calculating them anew. This simpliﬁca-
ion is not just a nuance but can be seen as part of the free en-
rgy minimization imperative, if one assumes that agents believe
hey will avoid costly computations, analogous to model selection
nd the “simpliﬁcation” of generative models by removing exces-
ive parameters [18,25,60] . 
Below we introduce three approximate Active Inference
chemes, in which the agent caches (probabilities of) G π values
f its policies, for each state. In the ﬁrst scheme, the cached val-
es are used to select the “best” policy, thus skipping entirely the
omputations of policy selection, planning and policy estimation.
n the second scheme, the cached values are used for planning,
hereas in the third scheme, the cached values are used for pol-
cy evaluation. In the next section, we introduce each scheme in
etail, discuss the differences between them, and highlight simi-
arities with caching mechanisms in biological and computational
heories of (reinforcement) learning. 
. Results 
We simulated the behaviour of an Active Inference agent in the
ouble T-maze shown in Fig. 1 for 40 trials (all results are an av-
rage of 100 simulations). The agent starts always from location 1
n the maze. The initial hidden context is A (i.e., reward location is
) from trial 1 to trial 20, and then it becomes context D (reward
ocation is 10) from trial 21 to trial 40 – thus requiring the agent
o change its policy. 
The generative model used for the simulations is shown in
ig. 2 . It comprises 40 states (10 locations × 4 contexts); 20 obser-
ations (10 locations × 2 cues: red = reward, white = no reward);
7 policies, which cover exhaustively the possible action sequences
n the maze. Note that only 4 of these policies potentially lead to
 reward, i.e., (up, left, up, left), (up, left, up, right), (up, right, up,
eft), (up, right, up, left). 
.1. Scheme 1: using the cache during action selection 
Suppose an agent has to solve the foraging task shown in
ig. 1 many times. If the agent remembers or caches the “value”
r “quality” of its policies from previous trials, then all it has to do
s to take (at the beginning of stage A) the maximum of this value mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of the generative model. The generative model comprises 10 control states, 40 hidden states and 20 observations. Red is a reward observation, 
while white is a neutral, non-rewarding stimulus. This ﬁgure shows that the starting location is always 1, but it can correspond to 4 different states depending on the context 
(e.g., state 1 if the context is A, state 4 if the context is D). There are 4 potential goal locations: location 5 if the context is A (which corresponds to state 17), location 7 if 
the context is B, location 8 if the context is C, and location 10 if the context is D (which corresponds to state 17). Note that in our simulations, we only use the two contexts 
A and D. We constructed 17 policies (not shown here) that cover the possible moves of the agent. The two most important policies are policy 1 = up, left, up, left, which is 



















































9  nder its beliefs about current hidden states; for example, that it is
tarting from location 1 in context A. This avoids having to reassess
he B,C and D stages of the procedure, and thus to re-compute the
olicies and engenders habitual behaviour. Clearly, this will only
ork if we assume one of the alternative policies constitutes a
iable solution for the current task. However, under this assump-
ion, the resulting scheme provides a graceful connection between
oal-directed active inference and habitual behaviour; the habit
s selected automatically when the agent is suﬃciently conﬁdent
hat it will result in preferred outcomes. The nice thing about this
cheme, is that habit selection is very simple: if, at the beginning
f each trial (before stage A), the maximum value of the expected
istribution, with respect to the expectations of the ﬁnal state, over
he policy beliefs conditioned by the hidden states, namely: 
 ˆ s(T ) [ P (π | s )] = 
∑ 
i 
ˆ s(T ) 
i 
P (π | s i ) (2)
s higher than a given reference value – for example, p th = 0 . 90 –
r equivalently, if there is a policy whose probability is higher than
.9 – then it can be selected automatically; otherwise, the quality
f all policies can be re-evaluated, to ensure that prior preferences
r task contingencies have not changed. 
In contrast to standard Active Inference, here the agent caches
he probability of all policies in each state P ( π | s ) (i.e., the
recision-weighted softmax of the expected free energy G π of poli-
ies), for each state. At the beginning of each trial, the agent does
ot use Active Inference; rather, it ﬁrstly checks if the cache of thePlease cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 ast context it experienced (in the previous trial) includes a policy
hose probability is higher than p th . If this is the case, it selects
deterministically) this policy. If not, it adopts the usual active in-
erence scheme shown in Fig. 2 and updates the cache: the pol-
cy probability values P ( π | s ) are updated using a sequential update
delta) rule: 
 (π | s ) t+1 = P (π | s ) t + w (t) ˆ s
(
ˆ π − P (π | s ) t 
)
(3)
n Eq. (3) , the updated policy probability (at time t + 1 ) considers
he cached policy probability (at current time) and a prediction er-
or term, which compares expectations about policy probabilities
nd their cached probabilities (at time t − 1 ). The prediction error
erm is weighted by w (t) 
ˆ s
, which corresponds to the probabilities
f each policies to take the agent occupying the expected state ˆ s at
he current time t . This implies that, the more conﬁdent the agent
s about being in a particular state, the more it will change policy
xpectations, conditioned on that state. This updating procedure is
sed for all policies in all the states that the agent entertains. 
The functioning of the ﬁrst caching scheme is illustrated in
ig. 4 . The ﬁrst four panels ( Fig. 3 3A-D) show the results of the
oraging simulations, averaged across 100 replications. Panel A rep-
esents the performance of the agent over trials 1–40 (in black)
nd its uncertainty about the current context (in red). After the
rst few trials, accuracy increases and uncertainty decreases. This
amping of accuracy (and decrease in uncertainty) is due to the
act that rewards are collected probabilistically (rewards appear
5% of the time in the contextually correct location; i.e., location 5 mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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1 Note that this scheme uses the policy probabilities of states 17 and 40 (not 
states 1 and 4) to decide whether or not to habitise (because, as explained in the 
main text, these are the max values in each context). Here, we show the proba- 
bilities of states 1 and 4, for consistency with the two subsequent schemes and 
because the relative probabilities of the policies are very similar in states 1 and 17 
(as well as in states 4 and 40); although of course the absolute values are not. in context A) and actions are selected stochastically during active
inference. However, the context changes at the 21th trial. Because
the agent is not immediately aware of the contextual change, it
will initially select the old, wrong policy – and fail. However, after
a few trials, its performance starts to recover, achieving a high level
of accuracy after few trials. Panel B reports how many times (aver-
aged across 10 0 0 repetitions) choice was habitised, for each trial.
This panel shows a progressive transfer of control from deliberative
choice to automatic habit selection, when uncertainty falls signif-
icantly (around trial 5), then a second transfer of control back to
deliberative choice (shortly after the contextual change of trial 21),
and a third transfer of control when uncertainty is resolved again
(around trial 30). Panel C shows the same phenomenon, but from
another angle: it reports the (average) probability of the highest
policy, and shows that (on average) the best policy surpasses the
habitisation threshold (here, p th = 0 . 9 ) around trial 5, then falls be-
low the threshold shortly after the contextual change of trial 21,
and surpasses the threshold again around trial 30. 
These results show that despite habitisation, context sensitivity
is preserved. This is because policy selection is based upon averag-
ing the quality of policies over beliefs about hidden states – that
include contextual factors. This means that if the agent encounters
a change in context, the outcomes will induce a loss of conﬁdence
about the context it is currently operating in. This will reduce the
relative probability of the habit, enabling a new policy to be eval-
uated online (and eventually the formation of another habit). In
other words, the fact that policies are context-speciﬁc allows the
agent to recover from wrong habits, after it notices a contextual
change (thus, with some delay). 
What are the beneﬁts of selecting policies automatically rather
than using the full deliberative scheme of active inference? Panel D
illustrates the beneﬁts of caching G π values in terms of a measure
of complexity: the (computational) time of the scheme. Initially,
computational time decreases towards a plateau that corresponds
to the habitisation stage. Computational time rises again follow-
ing the contextual switch and then decreases smoothly until the
last trial. On average, the time for the execution of a single trial is
0.0054 s. Note that computational time is just one of several ways
to characterize the “costs” of the different solutions; it is used here
as a proxy for various kinds of resources (e.g., attention, memory
and planning) that need to be allocated to deliberative control, see
[74] . 
The agent’s internal states that lead to habitisation and transfer
of control are illustrated in Fig. 4 E, which shows the probability of
the best policy for each of the 40 states, over time. Although this
ﬁgure shows values for each state (location × context), in our sim-
ulations we only use the maximum value for each context, which
corresponds to state 17 (in context A) and state 40 (in context D).
In other words, the agent would only need to know (cache) the
value of its best policy in each context (4 items rather than 40).
However, showing all 40 states in Fig. 4 E illustrates the progres-
sive development of a graded representation of the value of (the
best policy in) states, which has analogies with the notion of a
value function in reinforcement learning (although it is used dif-
ferently in this simulation), see [78] . One can see that this proba-
bility increases over the ﬁrst 20 trials for all the states along the
correct path under context A (i.e., states 1, 9, 5, 21 and 17, which
correspond to locations 1, 3, 2, 6 and 5 under context A). Note
that the probability is already high at state 1, which corresponds
to the start location, but increases with successive moves towards
the correct goal site (this is expected: in active inference, policy
values can only increase along the path if the agent collects no
new information). 
After the contextual change at trial 21, the probabilities of the
states along the correct path under context D start to increase. At
the same time, the probabilities of the states along the correct pathPlease cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 nder context A begin to decrease (although they remain signiﬁ-
antly higher than the probabilities of other paths). This is because,
fter the changing context, the agent becomes uncertain about the
urrent context (see Fig. 4 H); hence it updates the cached policy
xpectations under context A fallaciously. In other words, when it
ecalculates policy expectations, it updates policy expectations for
ll contexts A–D (albeit with a rather low weight w), rather than
nly in the states of context D, in which it currently occupies. Still,
ecause the agent identiﬁes the contextual change within a few
rials, it quickly begins to update only the states of context D and
oes not completely “wash out” the cache for context A. In other
ords, after a few trials, the agent correctly identiﬁes the existence
f two different contexts (A vs. D), each affording a different policy.
ontext sensitivity is important because it precludes catastrophic
orgetting – the replacement of old (but useful) memories when
ontext changes, at the expense of a larger state space. 
Panels F and G show the probability of the 17 possible policies
t the starting location in context A (i.e., state 1) and context D
i.e., state 4), respectively 1 . This probability is calculated by simply
e-normalizing the G π values of the different policies in states 1
nd 4 of Panel D. As shown in Panel F, the probability of the best
olicy (policy 1 = (up, left, up, left)) in state 1 increases over time
uring the ﬁrst 20 trials, in which the context remains stable. In
ther words, when the context does not change, policy selection
ecomes essentially deterministic – because the agent has identi-
ed the correct policy and, consequently, there is no need for ex-
loration or epistemic foraging [26] . In these conditions, caching
 π values is clearly more parsimonious than re-computing them.
s shown in Panel G, in correspondence of the contextual shift
t trial 21, the agent has no policy that is ﬁt for purpose for the
ew context. This is because it has not identiﬁed the contextual
hange yet (i.e., it still believes it is in context A, see Panel H) and
eeps selecting the best policy of context A (policy 1) for a while.
his perseveration is a typical effect of habitual behaviour and per-
ists until the agent correctly infers the changing context. When
he agent starts experiencing surprising outcomes (no reward) for
 few trials and becomes thus uncertain about the current context,
t starts exploring the task contingencies, as in the initial experi-
ental trials, until it identiﬁes a good policy (policy 2 = up, right,
p, right) for the new context D. At this point, the probability of
his new policy increases and behaviour can be habitised again. 
Panel H shows that after the contingency change at trial 21, the
gent incorrectly believes it is still in context A. This is because,
n our simulations, outcomes are collected probabilistically (95% of
he times); failing to solicit an expected outcome lowers the con-
dence about the context but does not necessarily mean that a
hange of context has occurred. Furthermore, the agent has a prior
elief that context will remain stable across trials 90% of the times
which enables it to use its knowledge accumulated during past
rials at the beginning of a new trial). As a consequence, changing
eliefs about context thus requires a few trials. During these trials,
he agent needs to explore other paths / policies, in order to re-
olve uncertainty (i.e. expected free energy) about the new context
s B, C or D (and to ﬁnd a good policy for the new context). 
In summary, this caching scheme solves the foraging task eﬃ-
iently and is more eﬃcient than the full active inference scheme.
owever, this scheme only considers whether a good policy was
vailable in the last context (during the previous trial) and selects
n action without estimating the context it ﬁnds itself in at the be- mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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Fig. 4. Simulation results of Scheme 1. Agent’s performance (A–C) and beliefs (E–H) during the 40 trials. All results are the average of 100 repetitions. (A) Performance (black) 
and uncertainty (red) of the agent in the 40 trials. Note that we changed the context (and reward contingencies) at trial 21. (B) Average percentage of habitised behaviour. 
(C) Probability of the best policy; the threshold for habitisation is 90%. (D) Computational time required by the scheme. (E) Maximum probability of a policy, for every state. 
Note that states are calculated as “locations × contexts”; thus, for example, states 1, 9, 5, 21 and 17 form the correct path for context A, and correspond to locations 1, 3, 2, 
6 and 5 of context A in Fig. 1 . (F) Probability of the 17 policies when the agent is in state 1; i.e., the starting location in context A. (G) Probability of the 17 policies when 


























w  inning of a new trial. This is not a problem (except during contex-
ual changes) in our simulations, where the context remains stable
or 20 trials. However, in other situations – such as when the con-
ext is more volatile (e.g., A-D-A-D) – this scheme would persever-
tes with the wrong policy – even if cued about the new context.
his limitation is addressed by the next caching scheme, which in-
ers the context before selecting a (deliberative or habitual) policy.
.2. Scheme 2: using the cache during planning 
The second caching scheme we considered uses the cache dur-
ng the planning phase (stage B, illustrated in Fig. 2 B) of Active In-
erence. If, during planning, the agent expects to be in a state hav-
ng a cached policy probability E (t) [ P (π | s )] exceeds the thresholdˆ s
Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 p th = 0 . 9 , it selects the policy, thereby skipping the rest of Active
nference evaluation. Otherwise, if the probabilities of all the ex-
ected policies are less than the threshold, it re-computes the pol-
cy G π values (and probabilities), updates the cache as in the ﬁrst
cheme, and proceeds with the usual Active Inference procedure.
n contrast to the ﬁrst caching scheme, here the agent infers the
urrent context and starts the planning procedure before selecting
eventually) a habit. This makes this second scheme slightly more
ostly than the ﬁrst, as the agent needs to infer its current state
nd form beliefs about the future hidden states expected under a
olicy, but still less costly than the full active inference procedure. 
Fig. 5 shows the results of this simulation using the same
ormat as Fig. 4 . Panels A–D are very similar in Figs. 4 and 5 ,
hich implies that despite the different caching mechanisms, the mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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Fig. 5. Simulation results of Scheme 2. Panels use the same format as in Fig. 4 , except for Panel B, where results are colour-coded, reﬂecting the fact that behaviour can be 


































s  performance of the two schemes is qualitatively similar. However,
there are some important differences due to the particularities
of the two schemes. The most important difference between this
scheme and the previous scheme emerges when one considers
that, in the current scheme, deliberative and habitual behaviour
can coexist in the same trial; i.e., the agent can deliberate at the
beginning of a trial and then complete the trial with a habit. In our
simulations, completing each trial requires 4 choices. In contrast to
Figs. 4 B, 5 B is colour-coded to illustrate when, during a trial (i.e.,
at the 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th choice) choice is habitised. The results
show that choice is under deliberative control in the ﬁrst trials, as
in the ﬁrst scheme. From the 5th trial, the agent begins to habi-
tise the last part of the trial (i.e., the 4th choice) and successively
earlier parts of the trial (i.e., the 3rd choice). This means that, over
time, the agent becomes more conﬁdent about the best policy ear-
lier in the trial – although with our choice of parameters (e.g., the
90% threshold) choice is never habitised from the beginning of thePlease cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 rial. In short, this scheme underwrites a progressive reduction of
omputational time, which is modestly longer, on average (0.006
 .) than the ﬁrst scheme. 
A further difference emerges if one considers that the current
cheme is slightly slower in reaching the threshold for habitisation,
oth before and after a changing context: compare Figs. 4 C and 5 C.
hile the ﬁrst scheme considered the context inferred on the last
rial (e.g., state 17), the second scheme only considers the (agent’s
elief about the) next states it can visit, which have on average
ower policy values. It thus takes longer for this scheme to reach
he threshold for habitisation. For the same reasons, policy prob-
bilities are generally greater in this second scheme compared to
he ﬁrst (compare Figs. 4 E and 5 E); this is especially evident in the
rst states visited by the policy (e.g., state 4 after the contextual
hange), which are important in this second scheme but somewhat
rrelevant in the ﬁrst. Of course, it would be possible to compen-
ate for the slight decrease of performance of the second scheme mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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o  y setting a lower threshold for habitisation, or a “relative” thresh-
ld that compares the probability of the ﬁrst and second-best poli-
ies (e.g., a policy would be selected if it is 90% more probable
han the second-best). 
.3. Scheme 3: using the cache during policy evaluation 
This third scheme is similar to the second, but uses cached val-
es during policy evaluation (stage C, illustrated in Fig. 2 C), not
uring planning. In Active Inference, evaluating the G π value of a
olicy requires a path integral of the expected free energy under
hat policy (see A.1 for details). Using the third caching scheme,
he agent terminates the path integral when it ﬁnds a policy for
hich E ˆ s(τ ) [ P (π | s )] , the expected value over ˆ s(τ ) of the policy
robability, is higher than 0.9, and selects this policy. Otherwise,
t completes the path integration normally and updates the cache.
his scheme has thus some analogies with algorithms in artiﬁ-Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 ial intelligence that perform “moderate” forward search, until they
nd a reliable cached value or chunk [7,30,38,59] . 
As shown in Figs. 6 , accuracy (Panel A) and the probability of
he best policy (Panel C) rise slightly more slowly in this scheme
ompared to the previous scheme. However, the values reached by
he habitual policy (Panel C) are slightly higher than the second
cheme, and comparable with the ﬁrst. This is because the third
cheme performs prospective predictions (during the policy eval-
ation) and, like the ﬁrst scheme, can potentially tap the (higher)
robability values cached under the terminal states (e.g., states 17
nd 40). As in the second scheme, in the third scheme deliber-
tive and habitual choice can coexist in the same trial. However,
hile in the second scheme, habits were most common for the
ast part of the trial (i.e., the 3rd and 4th choices), here they are
qually common throughout the trial (i.e., the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th
hoices). This difference can be seen by comparing Figs. 5 B and 6 B.
he ability to habitise the initial parts of the trial depends, again,
n the fact that this scheme performs prospective counterfactual mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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c  predictions. It is also evident in Panel C that the probability of the
best policy drops signiﬁcantly after the contextual change in trial
21; reﬂecting the fact that the relative values of policies are low at
that point. Finally, computational time is variable across trials, with
a mean time execution for a single trial equal to 0.0083 s . Given
that this scheme uses policy evaluation more often, it is slightly
slower than the previous schemes. 
5. Discussion 
We have considered the possibility that an Active Inference
agent caches (i.e., memorizes) the probability of policy (under the
current state) from previous trials, in order to reduce the compu-
tational costs required to calculate them anew at each new trial.
Using caching methods, either in isolation or in combination with
search-based methods, is popular in various areas of reinforcement
learning [78,79] , machine learning and artiﬁcial intelligence [30] ,
especially when it is necessary to address large state spaces. How-
ever, caching per se is not without costs: human and animal ex-
periments have shown that caching (and more generally reusing
old solutions to address new problems) can come at the expense of
(relative) behavioural inﬂexibility in the face of contextual changes,
which is typically associated with habitisation and/or automatic
action control [3,47] . Animals and artiﬁcial control systems thus
face the problem of trading-off the ﬂexibility of deliberative strate-
gies and the parsimony of habitual strategies, and need adaptive
strategies to transfer control between them. 
In the novel approximation of Active Inference illustrated here,
the agent caches the probability of its policies, which are cal-
culated as a function of their expected free energy G π is state-
speciﬁc (i.e., what is cached is a Softmax function of G π , for each
state). Of note, the expected free energy G π of policies used here
is estimated on the ﬂy using deliberative inference. Despite we
heuristically refer to G π as a “value” of policies, it is different
from the notion of a value function (of actions or action-states)
in model-free reinforcement learning, which is usually learned by
trial and error [82] . 
To motivate the novel caching scheme, we have exploited the
fact that the quality of policies, conditioned upon hidden states,
is constant over trials; provided contingencies and prior prefer-
ences do not change. In brief, this means the only quantity that
can change policy selection is the prior distribution over the initial
state – where this prior is based upon the posterior beliefs from
previous trials (e.g., one can infer a contextual change from the fact
that it has failed to collect a reward in the usual location). Thus,
an agent that caches the quality (or the probability) of policies can
safely reuse these values, unless a contextual change occurs. This
leads naturally to a theory of habit formation, in which habitual
policies form by caching the computations of a deliberative con-
troller [11,12,23,60] . 
We have illustrated three possible uses of caching, each asso-
ciated with a speciﬁc aspect of active inference: action selection,
planning and policy evaluation. Although these are just examples
of the many possible uses of a cache, they have analogies with
theories that emphasize that habitual behaviour eschews inferen-
tial processes entirely (ﬁrst scheme), that one can combine de-
liberation and habits even within a single task or a single trial
(second scheme), and that one can perform a limited or “mod-
erate” forward search until one ﬁnds a reliable cached value, see
[7,30,38,47] . 
The three caching schemes explored produce similar behavioral
results; but yet there are some differences amongst them, which
might reﬂect different kinds (or phases) of habitisation. The ﬁrst
scheme is slightly faster than the other two, as it uses the cached
values to elude the inferential mechanisms of active inference –
a “trick” that can however produce maladaptive behavior, if con-Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 exts are varied too often. In other words, this scheme would fail
o update a policy at the beginning of a new trial, even if it is
ued about a contextual change, producing inﬂexible perseveration.
onsider the case of a person who uses the same coffee machine
very morning. Even if one day he was told that the coffee ma-
hine is broken, he would fail to assimilate the contextual change
nto his policy selection and thus follow the usual habit (e.g., to
ry operating the coffee machine). The second and third schemes
re less prone to this problem, because they consider the current
ontext before selecting an action. However, unlike the full active
nference, the second and third schemes do not update the value
f policies based on all available knowledge, and might fail when
ome contingencies change more quickly than the update of the
ache (e.g., if the coffee machine is moved, they might sometimes
o to its previous location). Furthermore, given that these schemes
mplement a form of bounded search for (cached) policy probabil-
ties, they may become stuck in local minima; for example, they
ight select a suboptimal policy that reaches a smaller but prox-
mal reward, rather than an optimal policy that reaches a bigger
ut more distal reward. These problems are exacerbated by the fact
hat an agent using caching mechanisms does not explore properly.
n active inference, the balance between exploration and exploita-
ion depends on the relative importance of epistemic and prag-
atic values, which are jointly considered during policy evaluation
26] . Using caching mechanisms prevents updating policy values
n the correct way when epistemic value changes, thus leading to
uboptimal exploration. All these phenomena – perseveration, in-
ensibility to contingency changes, short-sightedness and subopti-
al exploration – have been variously associated with habitual be-
aviour. The fact that they may be partially dissociated under the
ifferent caching schemes explored here suggests that one can use
hese methods to probe the existence of different kinds of habits
n humans and other animals. 
Most theories of habits emphasize reduced behavioural variabil-
ty, too [84] . In keeping, the caching methods explored here reduce
ariability of behavior. However, in active inference, action selec-
ion tends to become deterministic over time, when uncertainty
ecreases, even without caching or the transfer of control to a ha-
itual controller. This is due to the convergence of various factors.
irst, the G π value computations become increasingly more simi-
ar over time, given that the context does not change (this is why
t is possible to cache them). Second, policy precision increases
ith time, as uncertainty about the current context decreases. Pol-
cy precision plays the role of the temperature parameter in the
oftmax used for action selection; hence, the higher the precision,
he more action selection becomes deterministic. Finally, epistemic
alue tends to disappear as uncertainty about the prevailing con-
ext decreases, further reducing the need for exploration [26,53] .
ence, in Active Inference, reduced behavioural variability does not
ecessarily imply a habit or the transfer of control from deliberate
o habitual mechanisms. 
Another hallmark of habits is inﬂexibility in the face of con-
extual changes. The general idea is that, if there was a trans-
er of control from deliberative to habitual (or automatic) mecha-
isms, an agent should not readapt its behaviour to novel circum-
tances (e.g., a change in reward contingencies), and/or it would
ail to transfer back control from habitual to deliberative mecha-
isms when necessary. Here, however, there is an important differ-
nce between the behavioural paradigms that are used in animal
earning (e.g., devaluation after overtraining, see [3] ), which show a
omplete inﬂexibility after overtraining, and the somewhat less ex-
reme situations that everybody experiences; e.g., recall the driver
xample in the introduction, in which a contextual change or a
ossible danger is detected, albeit with some delay, even when one
s under automatic control [47] . We argue that these two situations
an be reconciled if one considers the important role of context mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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t  onitoring (Panels H of Figs. 4–6 ). In our simulations, the agent
onitors the current context even when it uses cached policy val-
es. Shortly after a contextual change, it perseverates with the
rong behaviour, because it fails to notice the contextual change
this occurred in our simulations in trials 21–24). However, after
hat it can transfer control back to deliberative mechanisms [47] .
otice that the agent is relatively impaired for a few trials after a
ontextual change, because it has to estimate the next context and
nd a good policy to deal with it – by exploring under the control
f deliberative mechanisms. However, the agent does not show the
trong form of inﬂexibility that is sometimes reported in the ani-
al learning literature [3] , with a long-lasting perseveration, even
hen contextual changes are cued. The second and third approx-
mate active inference schemes illustrated above are especially re-
istant to excessive forms of behavioral inﬂexibility, as they explic-
tly consider their current context before action selection and can
hus more easily monitor contextual changes. 
One might speculate that the strongest forms of inﬂexibility
emonstrated in the animal learning literature (for example, af-
er overtraining) depend on a failure of monitoring contextual
hanges, which precludes transfer from habitual to deliberative
ontrol. Indeed, overtraining creates the preconditions for reduced
ontextual monitoring (in addition to habit formation), by biasing
owards an underestimate of the volatility (or rate of change) of
he environmental contingencies. This follows because, if the ani-
al always operates in the same environment, its prior belief that
he context will change may become extremely low – and it thus
ay fail to infer (or attend to cues) that the context has changed;
r to update appropriately its contextual estimation based on novel
vidence [26,51] . This hypothesis may explain why overtrained an-
mals become insensitive to reinforcer devaluation and other pro-
edures that assess the balance between habitual and deliberate
hoice [3,4,9,31,32] . 
From the perspective of active inference, this sort of context in-
ensitivity emerges as a consequence of treating policy selection
s Bayesian model selection. In other words, by associating poli-
ies with models of ‘how to behave’ one can articulate a failure
o consider certain models (e.g., a goal directed policy) in terms
f Ockham’s window. Ockham’s window provides a range of prior
robabilities that identify a set of models from which one is se-
ected. If the habitual policy is, a priori, suﬃciently more likely
han any other policy, it effectively precludes alternative policies
rom consideration. Future experiments that distinguish policy se-
ection from context monitoring may help test these and other
deas. 
It is worth noting that the forms of habit selection explored in
his paper will only work when the following conditions hold: (1)
he probability transitions under each policy are known; (2) the
rior preferences are ﬁxed; (3) each state is visited once and only
nce; (4) one of the policies entertained by the agent is a poten-
ial habit. These conditions constitute the requirements for a state-
ction policy. In other words, if there is a unique ‘best’ policy from
ny (initial) state, then it is possible to identify and select this pol-
cy given precise beliefs about the initial state (and cashed G π or
robability values). In a previous work [23] , we considered a re-
ated problem, in which the optimal habit is not included in the
epertoire of policies – but can be learned using sequential pol-
cy optimisation (i.e., goal directed active inference via estimat-
ng G π values at each time point). This allows de novo habits to
e learned under the hierarchical supervision or contextualisation
f goal directed active inference (with sequential policy optimisa-
ion). In other words, agents can learn habits through minimising
heir expected free energy – and then select them from an aug-
ented repertoire of policies, in a way that resembles the ﬁrst
cheme presented above (i.e., skipping planning and policy eval-
ation procedures). Both the caching method presented here andPlease cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 he policy learning method presented in [23] aim at exploring the
arious ways humans and other animals can implement intentional
ctions, while (under certain conditions) alleviating the computa-
ional burden of deliberative processing. 
It is possible to merge these approximate active inference
chemes or design new ones that enhance the agent’s performance.
or example, it would be easy to design caching mechanisms that
ombine elements of the ﬁrst and the second scheme, in which (1)
nly one policy is cached for each context, with a probability that
as in the ﬁrst scheme – reﬂects the value of the policy at the
ast state experienced under each context (e.g., state 17 for context
 and state 40 for context D), (2) the agent estimates its current
tate / context, as in the second scheme. This scheme would give
ehavioural results that are similar to the ﬁrst policy (results not
hown), but will be less prone to rapid contextual changes after
earning the most appropriate policy in each context. In the set-
ing of this article, we were not interested in testing all the possi-
le caching schemes or variants, but in demonstrating the utility of
aching in the transfer control from deliberate to habitual mecha-
isms, and vice versa, as a function of conﬁdence in the current
ontext and policy – and to understand when and why behaviour
ecomes inﬂexible. 
These problems have been widely addressed in other domains
uch as biological and computational (reinforcement) learning. Be-
ow we illustrate the main similarities and differences between our
roposal and related schemes in reinforcement learning. 
.1. Relations with previous theories of goals and habits 
Our proposal differs in many respects from widespread con-
eptualizations of goals and habits in brain and behavior [15] . A
ommon assumption in the literature is that deliberative and ha-
itual strategies of choice may correspond to two different con-
rol schemes that operate in parallel and compete in the brain.
n particular, the multicontroller hypothesis proposes that control
an be ﬂexibly allocated to one of two controllers, one for delib-
rative and one for habitual choice, based on their relative uncer-
ainty [10] . These two controllers map to model-based and model-
ree methods of reinforcement learning, respectively. While the
ormer (model-based) method entails a form of prospective evalua-
ion of future rewards, the latter (model-free) method uses cached
ction values for action selection. The multicontroller framework
hus explains the transfer of control from deliberative to habitual
hoice on the basis of the fact that, in general, the model-based
ontroller has lower uncertainty in early trials, and the model-free
ontroller in later trials [15] . Recent developments of this heuris-
ic have shown that – from both a computational and a biologi-
al perspective – the two controllers might be combined and real-
ze a continuum [40,48,59] or a hierarchy [12,60] , rather than be-
ng strictly separated or alternative. Furthermore, it has been sug-
ested that model-based and model-free controllers might operate
equentially rather than in parallel, and it is only when model-
ree mechanisms are insuﬃcient that model-based computations
re used to complement them – thus realizing a mixed controller
62] . Finally, it has been argued that the arbitration between delib-
rative and habitual modes might not depend on uncertainty only,
ut on more complex forms of cost-beneﬁts computations [37,59] . 
Our proposal shares some similarities with the multicontroller
ypothesis (and related views), such as the idea of mapping delib-
rative and habitual mechanisms into distinct computational pro-
esses; and the fact that environmental uncertainty is one of the
actors determining the transfer of control from deliberative to ha-
itual strategies, and vice versa. However, our proposal differs from
he multicontroller hypothesis, in many respects. 
In the framework described here, deliberative processing maps
o active inference, whereas habitual processing results from mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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n  caching deliberative policies – or, when they are not suﬃcient,
learning habitual policies on top of previous deliberative choices
[23] . This view has a number of implications. First, the distinction
between deliberative and habitual schemes maps to a mechanistic
distinction between belief-based (active inference) and belief-free
schemes. In the current implementation, which uses cached policy
probabilities, the latter (belief-free) scheme is essentially stimulus-
response, and is thus value-free; i.e., it does not explicitly include
state value representations [23,44,60] . This is markedly different
from the idea that habitual mechanisms correspond to model-free
RL, which uses cached action values [10] . The perspective advanced
here is thus more compatible with recent theories that cast doubt
on the fact that value representations are central to habits and
propose that habits encode stimulus-response pairs instead; see
[43,44,84] for a recent review. 
Furthermore, our schemes suggest that the transfer of control
from deliberative to habitual processing may depend on the in-
creased reliability of cached policies, when contingencies do not
change, whereas the transfer of control from habitual to delibera-
tive processing is not immediate but calls on a contextual estima-
tion. Note that in these schemes, there is a unique mechanism (or
threshold) that determines the passage from deliberation to habits,
and vice versa. This is because the cached policy probabilities that
generate habits are associated with speciﬁc states or contexts. If
the agent is in a state for which a cached policy probability ex-
ceeds the threshold, it can select it direcly – thus instantiating
a transition from deliberative to habitual choice. However, if the
agent detects a contextual change to a state for which none of its
policy probabilities exceed the threshold, then it has to use full
active inference – thus determining a transition from habitual to
deliberative choice. The same transition can occur when the agent
becomes unsure about what state it is in. This points to the recog-
nised link between environmental uncertainty and deliberative be-
haviour. In turn, this implies that if an agent under habitual con-
trol keeps monitoring (the consequences of) its behaviour [47] , it
can detect surprises – (e.g., the fact that an expected cue or re-
ward was not observed) and contextual changes – and thus trans-
fer control. It may be thus the failure to appropriately monitor and
update contextual information, and not just the use of a habit, that
underwrites behavioural inﬂexibility. 
Another implication of our proposal is that deliberative and ha-
bitual choices are not learned in parallel, as assumed by the multi-
controller view [10] , but rather, the latter derives from (caching)
the former. In other words, deliberative strategies are acquired
ﬁrst and scaffold the acquisition of habitual strategies. For exam-
ple, habitual strategies may derive from a sort of “compression”
or “caching” of deliberative strategies (e.g., by chunking action
sequences) that entail a more parsimonious use of cognitive re-
sources while preserving accuracy – at least when the agent has
no residual uncertainty about the environment [11,12,23,49,60,61] .
This leads us to the next point, which concerns the relations be-
tween our scheme and Bayesian model selection or averaging. 
5.2. Relations with Bayesian model selection (or averaging) 
As discussed above most reinforcement learning theories as-
sume that model-based and model-free controllers learn in par-
allel, our formulation is more related to the alternative view that
habitual policies derive from the progressive simpliﬁcation or com-
pression (via caching, chunking or other methods) of a deliberative
controller [12,23,60] . The general idea is that simplifying the com-
putations (or reducing the generative model) required for the full
active inference is yet another way to minimize free energy. In the
present study, the simpliﬁcation consists in caching policy proba-
bilities. However, there are other alternative ways to simplify ac-
tive inference. A previous simulation has shown that an active in-Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 erence agent can progressively acquire state-action (or stimulus-
esponse) policies that can be directly activated by stimuli rather
han by internal inferential processes [23] . Another possibility con-
ists in using minimal predictive controllers that are much reduced
ompared to the (relatively) sophisticated generative model con-
idered in our simulations, but yet are suﬃcient to guide simple
orms of adaptive behaviour [18] . Interestingly, these methods to
implify inference have close connections with Bayesian model se-
ection (or averaging). 
Indeed, there is a close connection between policy selection and
ayesian model selection (or averaging). This follows from the fact
hat the expected free energy ( G π ) value is the expected log model
vidence or marginal likelihood, under each policy. Therefore, in
ctive inference, selecting a policy corresponds to Bayesian model
election, where the quality of a policy becomes the evidence for
hat policy, expected under current beliefs about the state of the
orld. This means that there is a graceful link between policy se-
ection, the balance between goal directed and habitual behaviour
nd the notion of Bayesian model selection or averaging in de-
ermining the best action. Previous work has explored the idea
hat control can be allocated amongst various internal models by
eighting the accuracy and complexity of the candidate controllers
18] . The balance between full deliberation and habits explored
ere can be described in an analogous way. However, here we have
onsidered the possibility that the simplest controller is not based
n an internal generative model as in [18] but potentially a model-
ree construct such as a list of (cached) policy probabilities under
ifferent contexts (consider Panels E in Figs. 4–6 ). 
Furthermore, it is possible to cast the model-selection process
s a serial evaluation process, which only considers the more com-
lex (e.g., deliberative) model if it has any chance to improve over
he simpler model (e.g., in the cache), given knowledge of the
urrent state. In other words, it is only when the simpler model
s judged insuﬃcient that a more complex model is considered,
hus saving on computational resources [62] . In slightly more for-
al terms, one can imagine that the agent has a priori knowl-
dge of the ratio of complexity of the two models (say, the sim-
ler model has 2/3 the complexity of the more complex model).
his would imply that the agent could automatically set a thresh-
ld of accuracy for engaging the simpler model (in this case, 67%).
ndeed, if the ratio of the accuracies is 2/3 in favour of the sim-
ler controller, and the simpler controller has 67% accuracy, its
odel selection (accuracy vs. complexity) score would be higher
f the more complex model, even if this model has 100% accu-
acy (because 67/100 > 2/3). Analogously, if one considers a hier-
rchical active inference architecture, one can imagine that sim-
ler controllers are lower in the hierarchy and are able to steer
ction when their accuracy or precision is suﬃciently high. When
his is not the case, more complex controllers that are higher
n the hierarchy are also engaged and contextualize action selec-
ion [54,60] . One can also look at this model selection problem
he other way around, and consider that deliberative processing
ay be engaged when possible, but there may be conditions (e.g.,
ual tasks or mental fatigue) that prevent doing so [50] . In all
ases, the model selection problem can be modelled in terms of
 cost-beneﬁt trade-off between resources required (e.g., complex-
ty and/or its proxy that we measured used here: computational
ime) and accuracy of deliberative or habitual schemes. 
A more abstract take on this issue derives from the imperative
o minimise the path or time integral of free energy. If we con-
ider natural selection as a form of (hierarchical) Bayesian model
election, then computational eﬃciency becomes operationally im-
ortant – and a key determinant of the time integral of free en-
rgy [21] . This means that agents or phenotypes that can minimise
ree energy quickly will be selected over agents that do not. Tech-
ically, this is just a restatement of Hamilton’s principle of least mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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p  ction, because the time integral of free energy is a Hamiltonian
ction. 
.3. Relations with neurophysiology 
It is widely assumed that, at the neurophysiological level, de-
iberate and habitual control might use partially different neuronal
ircuits, engaging for example dorsolateral striatum for habits and
orsomedial striatum for deliberation and forward search [15] (but
ee [41] for evidence for a more integrative view). Habitisation
as been associated with the transfer of control to the dorsolat-
ral striatum, where neural representations of habits have been
eported that bear an important similarity with our simulations.
hen a rat performs a new task, these neurons only ﬁre at reward
ocations; but this activity “shifts” back (gradually) to the start lo-
ation when the task is routinised [34] . This behaviour is similar
o changes in policy values at the start location (states 1 and 4 in
igs. 4–6 ). When a habit has been selected, these neurons ﬁre both
t start and goal location – a phenomenon that has been termed
task bracketing” [80] . While ﬁring at start locations may be linked
o action selection, ﬁring at the end of the trial might reﬂect pol-
cy value or contextual updates – of the kind that characterise the
chemes described above. 
The neuronal underpinnings of deliberate and habitual choices
xtend beyond the striatal areas described above and include other
ubcortical and cortical networks [15,52,63,68] . For example, sev-
ral studies have showed that lesions to orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
r basolateral amygdala render animals insensitive to reinforcer
evaluation and promote behavioural inﬂexibility [4,31,65,66] . As
iscussed above — in the schemes proposed here — severe forms
f behavioural inﬂexibility may stem from the failure of monitor-
ng contextual changes or of updating state estimations appropri-
tely. It is possible to speculate that lesions to structures like the
FC and the amygdala may compromise these functions, thus mak-
ng animals unable to adapt to changes in task and reward contin-
encies – and ultimately to deploy ﬂexible goal-directed behaviour.
hese ideas remain to be fully tested in future studies. 
Another open question is whether a central arbitrator (possi-
ly in frontal cortices [40,69] ) monitors the opportunity to en-
age deliberative mechanisms; using something analogous to the
imple threshold-passing method described here. A possible al-
ernative is that the balance between deliberate and habitual be-
aviour depends on a more hierarchical and distributed architec-
ure, in which higher hierarchical layers (encoding more delibera-
ive mechanisms) contextualize lower hierarchical layers (encoding
abitual patterns that can be triggered by environmental cues) –
ut the latter can become relatively insensible to the former when
hey acquire suﬃcient precision [60,61] . Either way, at some point
he neural system would engage model-based planning and the
serial) evaluation of candidate policies, possibly in prefrontal areas
nd – at least in spatial tasks – the hippocampus [8,57,59,62,64,69] .
ote that the deliberative system can be engaged off-line, too; for
xample, to support memory consolidation and to train the habit-
al system [39,56,79] . This would allow to cache policy expecta-
ions even before an actual choice has to be made (e.g., during
leep or between decision episodes rather than prior to an actual
ecision) – hence effectively em ploying (costly) model-based com-
utations to form cached memories for future use, rather than for
or in addition to) on-line decision and planning. This mechanism
as been often linked to internally generated hippocampal dynam-
cs and the “replay” of experience [13,20,57,75] . 
Future studies are required that test these ideas, by assessing
he conditions that promote the engagement deliberative process-
ng; the transfer of control from deliberative to habitual processing,
nd vice versa; and the relative importance of model-based com-
utations for on-line and off-line uses. Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 eclaration of interest 
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ppendix A. Mathematical formulation of Active Inference 
Active Inference in discrete time and with discrete states can
e described as a partially observable Markov decision process or
OMDP. It is deﬁned as a tuple ( P, Q, R, S, A, U , ) where 
•  is a ﬁnite set of observations o 
• A is a ﬁnite set of action a 
• S is a ﬁnite set of hidden states s 
• U is a ﬁnite set of control states u 
• R is a probability distribution over ˜ o ∈ , ˜ s ∈ S and ˜ a ∈ A — re-
spectively sequences over time of observations, hidden states
and actions — generated by a generative process and such that: 
R ( ˜  o, ˜  s, ˜  a) = Pr ({ o (0) , . . . , o (t) } = ˜ o, { s (0) , . . . , s (t) } = ˜ s, 
{ a (0) , . . . , a (t−1) } = ˜ a) 
• P , the generative model , is a probability distribution over ˜ o ∈ ,
˜ s ∈ S, policies π j , j = 1 . . . , K — where π j returns a sequence of
control states { u (t) , . . . , u (T ) } ≡ { π(t) 
j 
, . . . , π(T ) 
j 
} — and parame- 
ters θ, such that: 
P ( ˜  o, ˜  s, π j , θ ) = Pr ({ o (0) , . . . , o (T ) } = ˜ o, { s (0) , . . . , s (T ) } = ˜ s, 
{ u (0) , . . . , u (T ) } = π j , θ = θψ ) 
with parameters θ ; 
• Q is an approximate posterior over hidden and control states
and a variable γ ∈ R denoted as precision , such that: 
Q( ˜  s, π j , γ | μ) = Pr ({ s (0) , . . . , s (T ) } = ˜ s, { u (t) , . . . , u (T ) } = π j ) 
with suﬃcient statistics (posterior expectation) ˆ μ = ( ˆ s, ˆ π, ˆ γ ) . 
Active inference rest on a continuous interplay among three
robability distributions: the former ( generative process ) describ-
ng the external environment and its dynamics, and the latter two
 generative model and approximate posterior over hidden states and
arameters) describing internal dynamics of an agent. The genera-
ive process describes how transitions between hidden states of the
xternal environment generate the observed outcomes through ac-
ions. In turn, these actions correspond to control states which are
etermined based on the agent’s beliefs about the next state(s).
hese beliefs are generated within the agent’s generative model that
escribes how the agent represents the environment and his ex-
hanges with it. However, to circumvent the intractability of exact
nference, the beliefs are expectations from an approximate poste-
ior of the full generative model; as explained below. 
.1. The generative model 
In term of Markov decision process, the generative model, with
arameters θ = { A , B , C , D , α, β} can be dynamically expressed
 mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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m  as: 
P ( ˜  o, ˜  s, π j , γ ) = P (π j ) P (γ ) P ( ˜  o| ˜  s) P ( ˜  s| π j ) 
where 
P ( ˜  o| ˜  s) = 
t ∏ 
i =0 
P (o (i ) | s (i ) ) (A.1)
P ( ˜  s| π j ) = P (s (0) ) 
t ∏ 
i =1 
P (s (i ) | s (i −1) , π j ) 
The ﬁrst equality expresses the model as joint distribution that
comprises conditional densities and empirical priors. The two ex-
pressions P ( ˜  o| ˜ s) and P ( ˜ s| π j ) establish that observations exclusively
depend upon the co-occurrent hidden states; and that dependen-
cies between successive hidden states are Markovian, respectively. 
A generative model can be parameterised in a general way as
follows: 
P (o (t) | s (t) ) = A (A.2a)
P (s (t+1) | s (t) , π j ) = B 
(




P (o (τ ) ) = C (A.2c)
P (s 0 ) = D (A.2d)
P (π j ) = σ (γ · G π ) (A.2e)
P (γ ) ∼ (α, β) (A.2f)
Accordingly, A encodes the likelihood of observations given the
state ( Eq. A.2a ) while the prior distributions over initial state and
future outcomes are encoded in Eqs. (A.2d) and ( A.2c ), respec-
tively with matrices D and C . State transitions are encoded with
B and depend on policy ( Eq. A.2b ) whose distribution ( Eq. A.2e )
is attained from a softmax function σ ( · ) of the inner product
( A · B = A T B ) between its expected free energy G π and the preci-
sion γ sampled from a  distribution with parameters α and β
( Eq. A.2f ). 
The quantity expressed with G π deserves more attention. It can
be considered as the quality of a generic policy π j and substan-
tially plays the role of (prior) beliefs over the policy, with respect
to the current state and the preferred outcomes. These beliefs rest
on (preferred) outcomes in the future, because these beliefs de-
termine action and action determines subsequent outcomes. This
means that policies should, a priori, minimise the free energy of
beliefs about the future – i.e., an expected free energy. Formally,
it is possible determine this quality value by using with the path
integral 2 (from the current at time t to the ﬁnal state at time T ) of
free energy expected under the policy π j [26] : 
G π = 
T ∑ 
τ= t 
G(π j , τ ) (A.3)
where 




P (o (τ ) | s (τ ) ) ]]− D KL 
[
Q(o (τ ) | π j ) || P (o (τ ) ) 
]
(A.4)2 This idea follows a formulation of quantum mechanics formulated by Feynmann 
[17] in terms of a generalisation of the least action principle of classical mechanics. 
In this formulation, the behaviour of a quantum system is described by considering 
a composition over an inﬁnity of potential trajectories, instead of a unique one as in 
classical mechanics. Path integral methods have been recently applied to a general 
class of control problems, to measure the cost of the optimal decision for rational 






Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 nd ˜ Q = Q(o (τ ) , s (τ ) | π j ) . The above expression can be expressed in
erm of the generative model and taking a more compact and sim-
ler form: 




H · ˆ s(τ ) π − ( ln ˆ  o(τ ) π − lnP (o (τ ) )) · ˆ o(τ ) π
)
ˆ (τ ) π = B 
(
u (τ ) = π(τ ) 
j 
)
· ˆ s(τ ) 
ˆ (τ ) π = A · ˆ s(τ ) π
nP (o (τ ) ) = ln C τ
 = −(A × ln A ) (A.5)
here “× ” denotes a product element-by-element. Note that two
erms in Eq. (A.5) represent ambiguity (i.e., uncertainty about out-
omes, in relation to the state of the world) and risk (i.e., relative
ntropy or uncertainty about outcomes, in relation to preferences),
espectively; where utility lnP ( o τ ) is a vector of preferences over
uture outcomes. 
.2. The approximate posterior 
In general, Bayesian inference using the full generative model is
ntractable. To circumvent this problem, active inference appeals to
pproximate (variational) inference using an approximate posterior
ather than the full generative model. 
Therefore, after having speciﬁed the shape of the genera-
ive model, it is necessary to specify its approximate posterior
( ˜ s, π, γ | μ) – for which we need to ﬁnd the suﬃcient statistics
= ( ˆ s, ˆ π, ˆ γ ) ∈ R + that minimise free energy. The role of the suﬃ-
ient statistics μ is to allow the factorisation of the approximate
osterior into marginal distributions that reduce the size of the
tate space (thus render inference tractable) by replacing posterior
ependencies among hidden variables. 
By exploiting the Markovian dependencies among successive
tates, we can assume that, at each time t , the approximate pos-




ˆ s, ˆ π, γ | μ) = Q (s ( 0 ) | ˆ s( 0 ) ) . . . Q (s ( t ) | ˆ s( t ) )Q (u ( t ) , . . . , u ( T ) | ˆ  π)Q (γ | ˆ  γ )
(A.6)
here 








( ˜  u ≡ πk | ˆ  π) = ˆ πk with 
∑ 
k 
ˆ πk = 1 
(γ | ˆ  γ ) ∼ (α, ˆ β = α/ ˆ  γ ) 
Eq. (A.6) represents the mean ﬁeld assumption by means of
hich the approximate posterior Q can factorise over its parame-
ers [35] . Note that because we have used the Markovian property
f the generative model, this is not an approximation – except for
recision, given the existence of conditional dependencies between
recision and hidden states. 
Equipped with the generative model ( Eq. A.1 ) and the approxi-
ate posterior with the mean ﬁeld assumption ( Eq. A.6 ), it is pos-
ible to minimise variational free energy and solve the Bayesian
nference. 
.3. Free energy and variational Bayes inference 
Active inference rests on free energy minimisation with respect
o suﬃcient statistics (expectations) of the approximate posterior mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
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end for bout hidden states, control states (policies) and precision. More
recisely, active inference assumes that, given the free energy: 
 ( ˜  o, μ) = E Q [ − ln P ( ˜  o, ˜  s, π, γ ) ] − H [ Q( ˜  s, π, γ | μ) ] (A.7)
here exist suﬃcient statistics ˆ μ that minimise F : 
ˆ t = arg min 
μ
F ( ˜  o, μ) 
uch that the ensuing beliefs about control states comprised in the
olicies prescribe current action: 
 r 
(




u (t) | ˆ  μ(t) )
ayesian inference (which consists in calculating posterior from
rior beliefs) thus turns into an optimisation problem – where we
eed to ﬁnd out the values ˆ μt that minimise the objective function
epresented in Eq. (A.7) . 
Suﬃcient statistics, and implicitly Bayesian estimations of hid-
en variables, are obtained by iterating the following updating
quations (see Appendix B of [26] for details): 
ˆ (t) ≈ σ
(




· ˆ s(t−1) ) 
)
ˆ π = σ ( ˆ  γ · G π ) 
ˆ γ = α
β − G ˆ π
(A.8) 
he ﬁrst equation updates expectations about hidden states and
orresponds to perceptual inference or state estimation (note that
he dependency of value on expected states – or optimism – bias
as been ignored for simplicity, given it is not numerically rele-
ant). 
The second update is a softmax function of the value of each
olicy, where the sensitivity parameter is an increasing function of
xpected value. This means that the sensitivity, or inverse tempera-
ure, that determines the precision with which a policy is selected,
ncreases with the expected value of those policies. This essentially
enders action selection more deterministic when better policies
re available. 
The third update optimises expected precision. As can be easily
ppreciated, if an observation increases the expected value of the
olicies entertained by an agent, then expected precision increases
i.e., temperature decreases) and the agent is implicitly more con-
dent in selecting the next action. Minimization of free energy ap-
eals to the iteration of these three updates are – which have also
ice correspondences in terms of brain dynamics, see [24] . 
ppendix B. Pseudocode of Active Inference 
for t from 1 to T do 
compute expectations about hidden states ˆ s(t) 
for j from 1 to K do 
G π j ← 0 
for τ from t to T do 
estimate ˆ s( τ ) and ˆ o(τ ) 
G π j ← G π j + G 
(




compute expectations ˆ π and ˆ γ
assess a (t+1) from Q 
(
π | ˆ s(t) , ˆ π, ˆ γ )
sample s (t+1) and o (t+1) 
end for 
ppendix C. Pseudocodes of the proposed caching Active 
nference schemes 
.1. Pseudocode of Scheme 1 
if max π E (T ) [ P (π | s )] > p th then ˆ s
Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 for t from 1 to T do 
π∗ = arg max πE ˆ s(T ) [ P (π | s )] 
get a (t+1) by means of π∗
determine s (t+1) and o (t+1) 
end for 
else 
for t from 1 to T do 
compute expectations about hidden states ˆ s(t) 
for j from 1 to K do 
G π j ← 0 
for τ from t to T do 
estimate ˆ s(τ ) and ˆ o(τ ) 
G π j ← G π j + G 
(




compute expectations ˆ π and ˆ γ
update policy beliefs P (π | s ) via Eq. 3 
assess a (t+1) from Q 
(
π | ˆ s(t) , ˆ π, ˆ γ )
sample s (t+1) and o (t+1) 
end for 
end if 
.2. Pseudocode of Scheme 2 
for t from 1 to T do 
compute expectations about hidden states ˆ s(t) 
if max π E ˆ s(t) [ P (π | s )] > p th then 
π∗ = arg max E ˆ s(t) [ P (π | s )] 
get a (t+1) by means of π∗
determine s (t+1) and o (t+1) 
else 
for j from 1 to K do 
G π j ← 0 
for τ from t to T do 
estimate ˆ s(τ ) and ˆ o(τ ) 
G π j ← G π j + G 
(




compute expectations ˆ π and ˆ γ
update policy beliefs P (π | s ) via Eq. (3) 
assess a (t+1) from Q 
(
π | ˆ s(t) , ˆ π, ˆ γ )
sample s (t+1) and o (t+1) 
end if 
end for 
.3. Pseudocode of Scheme 3 
for t from 1 to T do 
compute expectations about hidden states ˆ s(t) 
for j from 1 to K do 
G π j ← 0 
for τ from t to T do 
estimate ˆ s(τ ) and ˆ o(τ ) 
if E ˆ s(τ ) [ P (π j | s )] > p th then 
keep the G π j value computed so far 
else 
G π j ← G π j + G 
(





compute expectations ˆ π and ˆ γ
update policy beliefs P (π | s ) via Eq. (3) 
assess a (t+1) from Q 
(
π | ˆ s(t) , ˆ π, ˆ γ )
sample s (t+1) and o (t+1)  mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
16 D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 





































































































[1] W.R. Ashby , Design for a Brain: The Origin of Adaptive Behavior, Wiley, Oxford,
1952 . 
[2] H. Attias , Planning by probabilistic inference, in: Proceedings of the Ninth In-
ternational Workshop on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Statistics, 2003 . Pages –
[3] B.W. Balleine , A. Dickinson , Goal-directed instrumental action: contingency
and incentive learning and their cortical substrates, Neuropharmacology 37
(4–5) (1998) 407–419 . 
[4] B.W. Balleine , A.S. Killcross , A. Dickinson , The effect of lesions of the ba-
solateral amygdala on instrumental conditioning, J. Neurosci. 23 (2) (2003)
666–675 . 
[5] M. Botvinick , M. Toussaint , Planning as inference, Trends Cogn. Sci. 16 (10)
(2012) 4 85–4 88 . 
[6] D.A . Braun , P.A . Ortega , E. Theodorou , S. Schaal , Path integral control and
bounded rationality, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Adaptive
Dynamic Programming And Reinforcement Learning (ADPRL), IEEE, 2011,
pp. 202–209 . 
[7] W. Chase , H. Simon , Perception in chess, Cognitive Psychol. 4 (1973) 55–81 . 
[8] F. Chersi , F. Donnarumma , G. Pezzulo , Mental imagery in the navigation do-
main: a computational model of sensory-motor simulation mechanisms, Ada.
Behav. 21 (4) (2013) 251–262 . [IF: 1.151]. 
[9] R.M. Colwill , R.A. Rescorla , Associative structures in instrumental learning, Psy-
chol. Learn. Motivat. Elsevier 20 (1986) 55–104 . 
[10] N.D. Daw , Y. Niv , P. Dayan , Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal
and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control, Nature Neurosci. 8 (12)
(2005) 1704–1711 . 
[11] A. Dezfouli , B.W. Balleine , Habits, action sequences and reinforcement learning,
Eur. J. Neurosci. 35 (7) (2012) 1036–1051 . 
[12] A. Dezfouli , N.W. Lingawi , B.W. Balleine , Habits as action sequences: hierarchi-
cal action control and changes in outcome value, Philosoph. Trans. R. Soc. B
Biol. Sci. 369 (1655) (2014) 20130482 . 
[13] K. Diba , G. Buzski , Forward and reverse hippocampal place-cell sequences dur-
ing ripples, Natl. Neurosci. 10 (10) (2007) 1241–1242 . 
[14] A. Dickinson , B. Balleine , Motivational control of goal-directed action, Animal
Learn. Behav. 22 (1) (1994) 1–18 . 
[15] R.J. Dolan , P. Dayan , Goals and habits in the brain, Neuron 80 (2) (2013)
312–325 . 
[16] F. Donnarumma , D. Maisto , G. Pezzulo , Problem solving as probabilistic infer-
ence with subgoaling: Explaining human successes and pitfalls in the tower of
hanoi, PLoS Comput. Biol. 12 (4) (2016) e1004864 . [IF 2015: 4.587]. 
[17] R.P. Feynman , A.R. Hibbs , D.F. Styer , Quantum mechanics and path integrals,
Courier Corporat., 2010 . 
[18] T.H. FitzGerald , R.J. Dolan , K.J. Friston , Model averaging, optimal inference, and
habit formation, Front. Human Neurosci. 8 (2014) . 
[19] T.H.B. FitzGerald , P. Schwartenbeck , M. Moutoussis , R.J. Dolan , K. Friston , Ac-
tive inference, evidence accumulation, and the urn task, Neural Comput. 27
(2) (2015) 306–328 . 
[20] D. Foster , M. Wilson , Reverse replay of behavioural sequences in hippocampal
place cells during the awake state, Nature 440 (2006) 6 80–6 83 . 
[21] K. Friston , The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends Cogn.
Sci. 13 (7) (2009) 293–301 . 
[22] K. Friston , R. Adams , R. Montague , What is value—accumulated reward or evi-
dence? Front. Neurorobot. 6 (11) (2012) . 
[23] K. Friston , T. FitzGerald , F. Rigoli , P. Schwartenbeck , J. O’Doherty , G. Pezzulo ,
Active inference and learning, Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 68 (2016) 862–879 . [IF
2015: 8.58]. 
[24] K. Friston , T. FitzGerald , F. Rigoli , P. Schwartenbeck , G. Pezzulo , Active infer-
ence: a process theory, Neural Comput. 29 (1) (2016) 1–49 . [IF 2015: 1.626]. 
[25] K. Friston , M. Lin , C. Frith , G. Pezzulo , J. Hobson , S. Ondobaka , Active inference,
curiosity and insight, Neural Comput. 29 (10) (2017) 2633–2683 . [IF 2016:
1.938]. 
[26] K. Friston , F. Rigoli , D. Ognibene , C. Mathys , T. FitzGerald , G. Pezzulo , Active
inference and epistemic value, Cogn. Neurosci. 6 (2015) 187–214 . [IF: 2.373]. 
[27] K. Friston , S. Samothrakis , R. Montague , Active inference and agency: optimal
control without cost functions, Biol. Cybern. 106 (8–9) (2012) 523–541 . 
[28] K. Friston , P. Schwartenbeck , T. Fitzgerald , M. Moutoussis , T. Behrens , R.J. Dolan ,
The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency, Front Hum Neurosci. 7
(2013) 598 . 
[29] K. Friston , P. Schwartenbeck , T. FitzGerald , M. Moutoussis , T. Behrens ,
R.J. Dolan , The anatomy of choice: dopamine and decision-making, Philosoph.
Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 369 (1655) (2014) 20130481 . 
[30] S. Gelly , D. Silver , Monte-carlo tree search and rapid action value estimation
in computer go, Artif. Intell. 175 (11) (2011) 1856–1875 . 
[31] T. Hatﬁeld , J.S. Han , M. Conley , M. Gallagher , P. Holland , Neurotoxic lesions of
basolateral, but not central, amygdala interfere with pavlovian second-order
conditioning and reinforcer devaluation effects, J. Neurosci. 16 (16) (1996)
5256–5265 . 
[32] P.C. Holland , Relations between pavlovian-instrumental transfer and reinforcer
devaluation, J. Exper. Psychol. Animal Behav. Process. 30 (2) (2004) 104 . 
[33] D. Jacobson , Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential criteria and
their relation to deterministic differential games, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control,
AC-18 (1973) 124–131 . Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 [34] M.S. Jog , Kubota Y. , C.I. Connolly , A.M. Graybiel , V. Hillegaart , Building neural
representations of habits, Science 286 (5445) (1999) 1745–1749 . 
[35] M.I. Jordan , Z. Ghahramani , T.S. Jaakkola , L.K. Saul , An introduction to varia-
tional methods for graphical models, Mach. Learn. 37 (2) (1999) 183–233 . 
[36] H.J. Kappen , V. Gómez , M. Opper , Optimal control as a graphical model infer-
ence problem, Mach. Learn. 87 (2) (2012) 159–182 . 
[37] M. Keramati , A. Dezfouli , P. Piray , Speed/accuracy trade-off between the habit-
ual and the goal-directed processes, PLoS Comput. Biol. 7 (5) (2011) e1002055 .
[38] M. Keramati , P. Smittenaar , R.J. Dolan , P. Dayan , Adaptive integration of habits
into depth-limited planning deﬁnes a habitual-goal–directed spectrum, Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. 113 (45) (2016) 12868–12873 . 
[39] D. Kumaran , D. Hassabis , J.L. McClelland , What learning systems do intelligent
agents need? complementary learning systems theory updated, Trends Cogn.
Sci. 20 (7) (2016) 512–534 . 
[40] S.W. Lee , S. Shimojo , J.P. O’Doherty , Neural computations underlying arbitra-
tion between model-based and model-free learning, Neuron 81 (3) (2014)
687–699 . 
[41] S.W. Lee , S. Shimojo , J.P. O’Doherty , Neural computations underlying arbitra-
tion between model-based and model-free learning, Neuron 81 (3) (2014)
687–699 . 
[42] D. Maisto , F. Donnarumma , G. Pezzulo , Divide et impera: subgoaling reduces
the complexity of probabilistic inference and problem solving, J. R. Soc. Inter.
12 (104) (2015) 20141335 . [IF: 3.818]. 
[43] K. Miller, E. Ludvig, G. Pezzulo, A. Shenhav, Re-aligning models of habitual
and goal-directed decision-making, in: A. Bornstein, R.W. Morris, A. Shenhav
(Eds.), Goal-Directed Decision Making: Computations and Neural Circuits, El-
sevier, 2018. 
44] K.J. Miller , A. Shenhav , E.A. Ludvig , Habits without values, Psychol. Rev. 126 (2)
(2019) 292–311 . 
[45] M. Moutoussis , N.J. Trujillo-Barreto , W. El-Deredy , R. Dolan , K. Friston , A formal
model of interpersonal inference, Front. Human Neurosci. 8 (2014) 160 . 
[46] R. Nishimoto , J. Tani , Development process of functional hierarchy for actions
and motor imagery: a constructivist view from synthetic neuro-robotics study,
Psychol. Res. (2009) . 
[47] D.A. Norman , T. Shallice , Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of
behaviour, in: R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz, D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness
and Self-Regulation: Advances in Research and Theory, Plenum Press, 1986,
pp. 1–18 . 
[48] J.P. O’Doherty , S.W. Lee , D. McNamee , The structure of reinforcement-learning
mechanisms in the human brain, Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 1 (2015) 94–100 . 
[49] S.B. Ostlund , N.E. Winterbauer , B.W. Balleine , Evidence of action sequence
chucking in goal-directed instrumental conditioning and its dependence on the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, J. Neurosci. 29 (25) (2009) 8280–8287 . 
[50] A.R. Otto , S.J. Gershman , A.B. Markman , N.D. Daw , The curse of planning: dis-
secting multiple reinforcement-learning systems by taxing the central execu-
tive, Psychol. Sci. 24 (5) (2013) 751–761 . 
[51] T. Parr , K. Friston , Uncertainty, epistemics and active inference, R. Soci. Interf.
14 (2017) 20170376 . 
[52] C.M.A. Pennartz , R. Ito , P.F. Verschure , F.P. Battaglia , T.W. Robbins , The hip-
pocampal-striatal axis in learning, prediction and goal-directed behavior,
Trends Neurosci. 34 (10) (2011) 548–559 . 
[53] G. Pezzulo , E. Cartoni , F. Rigoli , L. Pio-Lopez , K. Friston , Active inference,
epistemic value, and vicarious trial and error, Learn. Memory 23 (7) (2016)
322–338 . [IF 2015: 2.906]. 
[54] G. Pezzulo , P. Cisek , Navigating the affordance landscape: Feedback control as
a process model of behavior and cognition, Trends Cogn. Sci. 20 (6) (2016)
414–424 . [IF 2015: 17.850]. 
[55] G. Pezzulo , F. Donnarumma , P. Iodice , D. Maisto , I. Stoianov , Model-based ap-
proaches to active perception and control, Entropy 19 (6) (2017) 266 . [IF 2016:
1.821]. 
[56] G. Pezzulo , F. Donnarumma , D. Maisto , I.P. Stoianov , Planning at decision time
and in the background during spatial navigation, Under Rev. (2019) . 
[57] G. Pezzulo , C. Kemere , M. van der Meer , Internally generated hippocampal se-
quences as a vantage point to probe future-oriented cognition, Ann. New York
Acad. Sci. 1396 (2017) 144–165 . [IF 2015: 4.518]. 
[58] G. Pezzulo , F. Rigoli , The value of foresight: how prospection affects decision–
making, Front. Neurosci. 5 (79) (2011) 79 . [IF 2014: 3.656]. 
[59] G. Pezzulo , F. Rigoli , F. Chersi , The mixed instrumental controller: using value
of information to combine habitual choice and mental simulation, Front. Psy-
chol. 4 (2013) 92 . [IF: 2.843]. 
[60] G. Pezzulo , F. Rigoli , K. Friston , Active inference, homeostatic regulation and
adaptive behavioural control, Progr. Neurobiol. 134 (2015) 17–35 . [IF 2015:
13.177]. 
[61] G. Pezzulo , F. Rigoli , K. Friston , Hierarchical active inference: a theory of moti-
vated control, Trends Cogn. Sci. 22 (4) (2018) 294–306 . 
[62] G. Pezzulo , M.A. van der Meer , C.S. Lansink , C.M.A. Pennartz , Internally gener-
ated sequences in learning and executing goal-directed behavior, Trends Cogn.
Sci. 18 (12) (2014) 647–657 . [IF: 21.965]. 
[63] G. Pezzulo , P. Verschure , C. Balkenius , C. Pennartz , The principles of goal-di-
rected decision-making: from neural mechanisms to computation and robotics,
Philosoph. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 369 (2014) 20130470 . [IF 2014: 7.055]. 
[64] B.E. Pfeiffer , D.J. Foster , Hippocampal place-cell sequences depict future paths
to remembered goals, Nature 497 (2013) 74–79 .  mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 17 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 








































































 65] C.L. Pickens , M.P. Saddoris , M. Gallagher , P.C. Holland , Orbitofrontal lesions im-
pair use of cue-outcome associations in a devaluation task, Behav. Neurosci.
119 (1) (2005) 317 . 
66] C.L. Pickens , M.P. Saddoris , B. Setlow , M. Gallagher , P.C. Holland , G. Schoen-
baum , Different roles for orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral amygdala in a
reinforcer devaluation task, J. Neurosci. 23 (35) (2003) 11078–11084 . 
[67] W.T. Powers , Behavior: The Control of Perception, Aldine, Hawthorne, NY, 1973 .
68] A.D. Redish , Vicarious trial and error, Nature Rev. Neurosci. 17 (3) (2016)
147–159 . 
69] A.D. Redish , Vicarious trial and error, Nature Rev. Neurosci. 17 (3) (2016) 147 . 
[70] F. Schrodt , M.V. Butz , Just imagine! learning to emulate and infer actions with
a stochastic generative architecture, Front. Robot. AI 3 (2016) 5 . 
[71] P. Schwartenbeck , T.H. FitzGerald , C. Mathys , R. Dolan , K. Friston , The dopamin-
ergic midbrain encodes the expected certainty about desired outcomes, Cere-
bral Cortex Page bhu159 (2014) . 
[72] P. Schwartenbeck , T.H. FitzGerald , C. Mathys , R. Dolan , F. Wurst , M. Kronbich-
ler , K. Friston , Optimal inference with suboptimal models: addiction and active
Bayesian inference, Med. Hypoth. 84 (2) (2015) 109–117 . 
[73] A.K. Seth, The cybernetic Bayesian brain, Open Mind. Open MIND. Frankfurt
am Main: MIND Group, 2014. 
[74] A. Shenhav , M.M. Botvinick , J.D. Cohen , The expected value of control: an in-
tegrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex function, Neuron 79 (2) (2013)
217–240 . 
75] W.E. Skaggs , B.L. McNaughton , Replay of neuronal ﬁring sequences in rat hip-
pocampus during sleep following spatial experience, Science 271 (5257) (1996)
1870–1873 . 
[76] I. Stoianov , A. Genovesio , G. Pezzulo , Prefrontal goal codes emerge as latent
states in probabilistic value learning, J. Cogn. Neurosci. 28 (1) (2016) 140–157 .
[IF 2015: 3.559]. 
[77] I.P. Stoianov , C.M. Pennartz , C.S. Lansink , G. Pezzulo , Model-based spatial nav-
igation in the hippocampus-ventral striatum circuit: a computational analysis,
PLoS Comput. Biol. 14 (9) (2018) e1006316 . 
78] R. Sutton , A. Barto , Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge MA, 1998 . 
79] R.S. Sutton , Integrated architectures for learning, planning, and reacting based
on approximating dynamic programming, in: Proceedings of the Seventh Inter-
national Conference on Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA,
1990, pp. 216–224 . 
80] C.A. Thorn , H. Atallah , M. Howe , A.M. Graybiel , Differential dynamics of activity
changes in dorsolateral and dorsomedial striatal loops during learning, Neuron
66 (5) (2010) 781–795 . 
81] M. Toussaint , A sensorimotor map: Modulating lateral interactions for antici-
pation and planning, Neural Comput. 18 (5) (2006) 1132–1155 . 
82] C.J.H. Watkins , P. Dayan , Q-learning, Mach. Learn. 8 (1992) 279–292 . 
83] N. Wiener , Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1948 . 
84] W. Wood , D. Rünger , Psychology of habit, Ann. Rev. Psychol. 67 (2016)
289–314 . 
85] P.J. Zak , Neuroeconomics, Philosoph. Trans. R. Soci. B Biol. Sci. 359 (1451)
(2004) 1737 . Please cite this article as: D. Maisto, K. Friston and G. Pezzulo, Caching
puting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.05.083 Domenico Maisto received the M. Sc. degree in physics
from “Federico II” University, Naples, Italy and the Ph.D
degree in Multiscale Modelling, Computational Simula-
tions and Characterization in Material and Life Sciences
from the University of Modena - Reggio Emilia, Italy.
Currently, he is a researcher at the Institute of High-
Performance Computing and Networking of National Re-
search Council of Italy. He has research interests in cy-
bernetics, artiﬁcial intelligence and machine learning; his
current interests include computational neuroscience and 
cognitive science. 
Karl Friston is a theoretical neuroscientist and author-
ity on brain imaging. He invented statistical parametric
mapping (SPM), voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and dy-
namic causal modelling (DCM). These contributions were
motivated by schizophrenia research and theoretical stud-
ies of value-learning, formulated as the dysconnection
hypothesis of schizophrenia.thematical contributions in- 
clude variational Laplacian procedures and generalized ﬁl-
tering for hierarchical Bayesian model inversion. Friston
currently works on models of functional integration in
the human brain and the principles that underlie neu-
ronal interactions.s main contribution to theoretical neu-
robiology is a free-energy principle for action and percep-
ion (active inference). Friston received the ﬁrst Young Investigators Award in Hu-
an Brain Mapping (1996) and was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Medical
ciences (1999). In 20 0 0 he was President of the international Organization of Hu-
an Brain Mapping. In 2003 he was awarded the Minerva Golden Brain Award and
as elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 2006. In 2008 he received a Medal,
ollege de France and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of York in 2011.
e became of Fellow of the Royal Society of Biology in 2012, received the Weldon
emorial prize and Medal in 2013 for contributions to mathematical biology and
as elected as a member of EMBO (excellence in the life sciences) in 2014d the
cademia Europaea in (2015). He was the 2016 recipient of thearles Branch Award
or unparalleled breakthroughs in Brain Research and the Glass Brain Award - a life-
ime achievement award in the ﬁeld of human brain mapping. He holds Honorary
octorates from the University of Zurich and Radboud University. 
Giovanni Pezzulo received the Ph.D. degree in cognitive
psychology from University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Italy,
in 2006. From 2009, he has been a permanent researcher
at the National Research Council of Italy, Institute of Cog-
nitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, Italy. His research
interests include goal-directed decision-making, embod- 
ied cognition, prediction and planning in living organisms
and artiﬁcial systems.  mechanisms for habit formation in Active Inference, Neurocom- 
